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Summary
This chapter provides an overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: (1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? (2) Which factors determine this difference? (3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This chapter attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.
Introduction
International pollution problems have become increasingly important issues on the agenda of politicians, economists and natural scientists. Prominent examples are the acidification of lakes and soils through sulfur and nitrogen oxides, the depletion of the ozone layer through chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and the rise of atmospheric temperature through so called greenhouse gases. A distinctive characteristic of international pollution problems is that pollution does not remain within national boundaries. Consequently, an optimal policy response would require that nations do not pursue a national but an international environmental policy where countries consider not only environmental damages at home but also those abroad caused by their emissions. This, however, requires coordination and cooperation among nations that is usually formalized in international environmental agreements (IEAs) of which those mentioned in the text are summarized in Table 1 . Canada; further negotiations resulted in a protocol signed and ratified in 1964. Legend: Signature means the formal acceptance of treaty targets by the negotiators of a treaty. Ratification is the formal confirmation and approval of a treaty that is necessary for a treaty to become binding. Accession means that a state is not among the original negotiators (signatories) and enters a treaty at a later stage. Accession implies de facto signature and ratification at the same time. Entry into force means that treaty provisions become binding, which requires usually a certain number of ratifications and/or accessions. Signatories comprise countries that signed a treaty and parties comprise countries which deposited their formal confirmation and approval of a treaty through ratification or accession. From a theoretical point of view, a first best solution to international pollution problems is straightforward and implies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). In a first step all countries emitting and suffering from a pollutant have to be identified. In a second step, information about abatement costs and benefits from abatement in the form of reduced damages have to be gathered. In a third step the optimal global abatement level and those of individual countries are determined by maximizing the difference between aggregate benefits and aggregate costs from abatement.
For the globally or socially optimal solution some general characteristics hold: (1) The higher aggregate benefits are compared to aggregate costs from global abatement, the higher is the globally optimal abatement level and vice versa; (2) Those countries with lower costs per unit of abatement (marginal abatement costs) should reduce pollution more than those with higher cost per unit of abatement; (3) If some countries face similar unit costs of abatement, then those countries that cause a higher environmental damage should abate more than countries which cause relatively lower environmental damage.
The first feature guarantees that the choice of the global abatement level is based on rational principles. It recognizes that abatement reduces environmental damages but is also associated with costs in the form of forgone production and consumption of goods. In particular, it recognizes the following relations. On the one hand, costs increase more than proportionally with increasing levels of abatement. That is, at high levels of abatement, an additional unit of abatement involves higher unit costs (marginal abatement costs) than at lower levels since more sophisticated abatement devices have to be implemented. On the other hand, benefits increase less than proportionally with increasing abatement levels. That is, at high levels of abatement, an additional unit of abatement generates less additional benefits (marginal benefits) since environmental quality is already high.
The first feature implies for instance that global abatement should be higher for CFCpollutants than for greenhouse gases. Both pollutants cause severe damages and therefore aggregate benefits as well as marginal benefits from abatement are high. However, abatement costs as well as marginal abatement costs of CFCs are relatively low compared to greenhouse gases since for CFCs cheap substitutes have been developed over recent years, whereas this option is currently not available for fossil fuels, the use of which causes greenhouse gases.
The second feature guarantees cost-efficiency. That is, abatement levels should be allocated to the various countries in such a way that the globally optimal abatement level is achieved at least cost. This feature is particularly important if an ambitious abatement level is implemented in order to keep costs at moderate and acceptable levels. It implies for instance in the case of greenhouse gases that developing countries and countries in transition should shoulder a greater abatement burden than industrialized countries since -on average -they face lower unit abatement costs. The reason is that in most industrialized countries the level of environmental protection is already high and hence additional abatement efforts are associated with high abatement costs. In contrast, in countries like China and Russia, energy efficiency is very low. That is, emissions per gross national product are very high and hence these countries can conduct abatement at low unit costs.
The third feature guarantees ecological efficiency. It does not apply to global pollutants but only to regional pollutants where the distributional pattern of the deposition of emissions, matters for global damages (for the regional implications see also Environmental conflicts and regional conflict management). For instance, Great Britain should reduce more sulfur emissions than other countries since most of its emissions are transported to Nordic countries with sensitive ecological systems where emissions cause much environmental damage. In contrast, global pollutants, like CFCs and greenhouse gases, mix uniformly into the atmosphere. Therefore, irrespective of which country reduces emissions, one unit of emission reduction generates the same global benefit.
The first and the third feature stress the first-best-solution character of the globally optimal solution: not only information about abatement costs but also about benefits from abatement is required to determine optimal abatement levels. If information about benefits from abatement is not available or uncertain, then a more pragmatic and second best solution to international pollution problems is to conduct a cost-efficiency analysis (CEA). In a first step only those countries emitting a pollutant have to be identified. In a second step, only information on abatement costs has to be gathered. In a third step, optimal individual abatement levels are determined by minimizing aggregate costs from abatement for a given global abatement target.
For such a pragmatic solution the second characteristic from above applies, except that the global abatement target is set by a decision-maker and may not be globally optimal. For instance, in the case of greenhouse gases the Kyoto Protocol targets at an emission reduction of 5.2 percent based on 1990 emission levels to be achieved in the period 2008-2012. Though this target has been set based on scientific evidence, it is certainly not globally optimal in the sense of a CBA but mainly reflects a political compromise between the signatories to this agreement (see International environmental agreements and the case of global warming). Since all countries emit greenhouse gases, a costefficient solution would also require -as in the case of a CBA -that all countries contribute to the achievement of this target and that, as mentioned above, developing countries and countries in transition contribute more to cost-efficient cooperation.
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From a practical point of view, however, things are less straightforward. Already a casual analysis of international environmental agreements reveals that implemented solutions are usually neither first nor second best solutions, and can be regarded at most as third best solutions. This will be illustrated with some empirical evidence that the author structures according to the following four features.
Participation
In most IEAs the number of parties falls short of the total number of countries involved in the externality problem. Here, involved countries means not only all countries in the full sense of a CBA (all countries that emit and suffer from a pollutant) but also just in the sense of CEA (all countries that emit a pollutant However, fewer countries participate in the amendment protocols, which followed the Montreal Protocol and which target at more ambitious abatement targets. For instance, the London Protocol signed in 1990 counts 153 participants, the Copenhagen Protocol signed in 1992 counts 128 participants, the Montreal Protocol signed in 1997 comprises 63 participants and the Beijing Protocol has been signed by 11 countries in 1999, though this last amendment protocol has not yet come into force since it has not been ratified by enough countries so far. Moreover, though sulfur is a major air pollutant that is emitted by and from which most countries suffer in Western and Eastern Europe and North America, the Helsinki Protocol signed in 1985 counts currently only 22 parties, of which 16 are EU-countries. In contrast, participation in the framework conventions preceding the abovementioned protocols, which are basically only declarations of concern about an environmental problem and declarations of intentions that pollution should be reduced without specific abatement obligations, is very high. For instance, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) preceding the Kyoto Protocol counts 186 parties, the Vienna Convention preceding the Montreal Protocol and its successor protocols counts 182 parties and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution (LRTAP) preceding the Helsinki Protocol counts 48 parties.
Compliance
There is ample evidence that even if countries participate in an IEA, they do not always comply with their abatement obligations. This applies not only to IEAs regulating pollutants but applies to IEAs in general and has been confirmed by many empirical studies on compliance conducted by political scientists. 
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT -International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems -Michael Finus ©Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS)
whaling that is legal under the whaling convention. As a result, Norway hunted five times as many whales in 1997 as in 1992. IEAs regulating pollutants are no exception. For instance, even though important CFCs are banned under the Montreal Protocol since 1991, customs officers throughout the world regularly intercept deliveries of these substances.
Effectiveness
The few empirical studies measuring the effectiveness of IEAs suggest that implemented abatement levels are close to those which countries would have implemented anyway if they had pursued their self-interest noncooperatively (national environmental policy). This has been confirmed for instance for the abovementioned Montreal Protocol signed in 1987, the Helsinki Protocol signed in 1985 and the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 but also for the Oslo Protocol that has been signed in 1994, which is the successor protocol to the Helsinki Protocol on sulfur reduction. That is, agreed abatement targets, though they may seem large in absolute terms, are small when compared to those required by a globally optimal solution.
Efficiency
As long as countries have different unit abatement costs, cost-efficiency requires that countries reduce emissions to a different extent. In reality, however, uniform solutions are part of many IEAs. Under many "old" IEAs uniform emission reduction quotas have been negotiated, which imply that countries have to reduce their emissions by the same percentage compared to some base year. The answer depends by and large on the field and method of the analysis. In this chapter the author surveys the answers of the environmental economics literature using coalition theory -a field of game theory -to analyze the formation and stability of IEAs. Game theory is a mathematical method analyzing and predicting the outcome of the interaction of agents. Coalition theory focuses on the possibilities of forming stable agreements between agents in order to pursue a common goal. In the game theoretical literature on international pollution problems 'agents' means countries or governments, a coalition is a group of cooperating countries that aims at reducing emissions beyond the noncooperative status quo and hence coalition theory is a method for analyzing the incentive structure of countries to participate in an IEA and to comply with the terms of the agreement. So far, this literature abstracted from the political decision process within countries for simplicity and assumed that governments aim at maximizing the welfare of their citizens (see Section 5 for a discussion of this assumption).
In what follows the author provides in Section 2 an informal sketch of the structure of coalition models and a preliminary answer to the first question raised above. Subsequently, the author discusses important factors which influence the success of cooperation in Section 3 and outline elements of treaty design that can hamper or encourage cooperation in Section 4. 
